Summary:
The recent NFT bear market has exposed major fault lines in the Bend protocol. Loans taken by holders during the previous market peak are now at risk of impairment. The fear of cascading liquidations have set off a chain of events that have submerged the protocol into a vicious downward spiral:
- The fear of cascading liquidations and loan impairments have caused lenders to flee the protocol en mass, creating a liquidity crunch that has limited withdrawals and additional borrowing. Protocol APRs have spiked to incentivize additional deposits but fears of a bank run have largely kept would-be depositors on the sidelines.
- As result of the spike in APRs, borrowers woke up over the weekend to untenable triple digit interest rates. This kicked off a subsequent round of repayments by credit worthy borrowers with overcollateralized loans, leaving the pool with a great proportion of loans where the borrowers either have no incentive (loans are already underwater) or means to repay.
- The combination of higher rates and riskier loans accelerates liquidations, putting further stress on the protocol and increasing the risk that remaining depositors see impairment from bad loans
While the core team and community at Bend have already put forward emergency proposals to stabilize the protocol, I believe structural issues must be addressed to ensure the protocol’s success in the long term.
Background:
The core issue with the existing Bend lending model is its inability to disaggregate and price different levels of risk. Under the current platform, a loan made at the maximum 40% LTV pays the same interest rate as one made at 10% LTV, even though the former is inherently more risky than the latter. This results in a classic moral hazard where degens are more inclined to borrow aggressively because part of their risk is being subsidized by more responsible borrowers in the pool. When a small number of these loans go bad, they taint the entire pool of loans and the resulting contagion causes an exodus of lenders putting Bend in its current predicament. To ensure that such events do not happen again in the future, it is vital that different levels of risk are appropriately isolated and priced to ensure more fairness and transparency.
Proposed Solution:
To address this issue, I propose that future lending / borrowing pools be separated into four pools based on their level of risk with different levels of interest rates (still subject to the same/similar formula that Bend uses to incentivize deposits):
- Pool A: For loans up to 10% LTV - this the lowest risk pool with a base APR of 7.5%
- Pool B: For loan amounts between 10 to 20% LTV - this is considered a moderate risk pool with a base borrow APR of 15%
- Pool C: For loan amounts between 20 to 30% LTV - this is considered a higher risk pool with a base borrow rate of 25%
- Pool D: For loan amounts between 30 to 40% LTV - this is the highest risk of pool for the most degen borrowers/lenders with a base borrow rate of 35%
For borrowers: Borrowing on Bend effectively becomes an act of borrowing from up to 4 pools depending on the amount being sought. A borrower looking for a 10% LTV loan will borrow exclusively from Pool A (while paying the lowest interest rate) while someone looking for the maximum borrowable amount will borrow from all 4 pools.
ie. Borrower A and B both have an BAYC that they want to take out a loan on. Assuming a floor price of 70 eth the maximum amount borrowable under Bend would be 28eth. Borrower A elects to borrow 14 eth - this results in him borrowing 7eth from Pool A at 7.5% and 7 eth from pool B at 15% for an effective interest rate of 11.25% on the total 14eth loan. Borrower B elects to borrow the maximum 28eth which entails 7 eth loans across all 4 pools resulting in a 28 eth loan with an effective interest rate of 20.625%. In this case, there is a clear distinction between the two loans and the rates charged to each based on their level of risk
For lenders: Under this framework, lenders can allocate their eth deposits based on their appropriate level of risk appetite. Lenders seeking a secure, low risk rate of return can opt to allocate exclusively to Pools and A and B while those with greater risk appetite can lend into Pools C-D to earn higher yields at risk of impairment.
Why does this matter?
- In a crisis such as the one currently unfolding in front of us - this structure should limit mass withdrawals that would kickstart a bank run:
- Lenders in Pools A and B have knowledge that they have a significant safety cushion on their deposits and remain incentivized to keep funds in the pool which ensures continuity on borrowing activity (vs the current situation where the spike in rates and lack of liquidity have pushed borrowing to a standstill)
- Lenders in Pools C and D will withdraw capital and potentially suffer losses, but there is a much better understanding of the potential risks involved from the outset
- For borrowers - this provides a much more effective way to manage their loans. In the event of a bear market where borrow rates on the riskier pools spike, credit worthy borrowers can opt to pay down the riskier portions of their loan and bring their interest rate down to more manageable levels vs withdrawing their otherwise good loans from the platform altogether
- Longer term, this model allows depositors to set the protocols appetite for different levels of loans
- in NFT bull markets, yield seeking depositors may allocate more eth to the riskier pools and enable borrowers to borrow at 20-40% LTVs with low interest rates
- In NFT bears, depositors become more risk averse and reduce their exposure to these pools, this reduces the amount of high LTV borrowing that can be done, proactively limiting the risk of incurring further bad loans
If you guys have made it this far, thanks for taking the time to read this and I’m looking forward to getting everyone’s feedback and furthering the discussion.