Proposal for establish a sub-treasury named "Non-performing Assets Investment Fund"

Author: Vis.eth, guoxinchen.eth, stephytao.eth;
Publication date: 2022-08-25;
Translator: DBOM.ETH;

Proposal Background:

Under the combined effects of external factors such as the current sluggish NFT market transactions, the drop of NFT value and the lack of liquidity, and the internal factors like improvable design of the BendDAO protocol, the BendDAO protocol has recently experienced negative developments, such as a large number of ETH withdrawals, soaring borrowing rates and the emergence of bad debt risks.

To make BendDAO the leader of NFT lending, and provide more stable, secure and efficient services for both lenders and borrowers, and also avoid prisoner’s dilemma and increase the market and community’s confidence in the protocol, we have initiated the following proposals:

Goals of the Proposal:

  1. The core reason for the situation is the lack of confidence, and ETH liquidity providers rapidly find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation;
  2. To quickly transfer most of the debts out from the ETH liquidity pool to counteract the prisoner’s dilemma;
  3. To enable the protocol to have the ability to increase its assets continuously, together with the higher TVL over time;
  4. The ability to increase its assets will help the protocol in debt level monitoring & shortfall balancing, and ecosystem incubation;

Proposal content:

  1. Establish a sub-treasury under the treasury, tentatively named “Non-performing Assets Investment Fund” (the “Fund”);

  2. Funding sources of the Fund:
    o 20% of the income of the protocol (the “risk reserve”) - injected into the Fund automatically;
    o Of the 21% token share initially allocated to the treasury, allocate 10% of the total BendToken (1 billion Bend) for refinancing, and then inject 50% of the funds (or tokens) obtained from the financing into the Fund (the financing mechanism is explained after this article);

  3. Automatically acquire non-performing assets at a 20% discount: The purpose of this Fund is to automatically acquire NFTs at the price of the debt amount x 0.8 when the liquidation fails (the health coefficient is lower than 0.8 and no one bids for the first time). Once the market price recovers, the fund management team decides the sale timing and sale price;

  4. ETH liquidity provider (lender) will temporarily bear 20% debt risk: when the Fund acquires non-performing assets, the ETH liquidity pool will still have a 20% debt shortfall, and ETH liquidity provider will bear this part of the risk exposure that is, in extreme cases, they may still have a small amount (20% of the total debt) of ETH funds that temporarily cannot be withdrawn on demand. When the debt shortfall is fixed, the withdrawal limit will be restored;

  5. Automatically fix the debt shortfall of the ETH liquidity pool: When there is a debt shortfall in the ETH liquidity pool, the risk reserve will automatically increase to 40% of the total revenue of the protocol, and half of it will be injected into the ETH liquidity pool until the debt shortfall is eliminated. After the shortfall is fixed, the risk reserve is automatically reduced to 20% of the total income of the protocol;

6.Fix the debt shortfall with the Fund’s investment gain: If there is still a debt shortfall in the ETH liquidity pool after the Fund sells NFTs and records investment gain, the net revenue of the Fund will be injected into the ETH liquidity pool to fill the shortfall. The injected amount will be 100% of the net revenue but not exceed the debt shortfall amount;

7.Second round financing:
o Institutional outreach; (the team selects interested, professional and influential VCs or KOLs and publishes proposals and financing details in the DAO. Any interested institutions and individuals are welcome to send their proposals to the BendDAO forum. Both of these methods will be subject to collective negotiation in the DAO)
o Allocate 10% of the total BendToken (1 billion Bend) from the treasury for financing;
o As mentioned above, 50% of the financing will be injected into the non-performing asset investment fund, and the other 50% will be injected into the ecosystem fund (also under the BendDAO treasury);
o The post-money valuation is about 200 million US dollars (which can be adjusted after community discussion), the financing currency is ETH, the exchange price is 100ETH = 8,333,333.33 Bend, the amount of ETH financing is 12,000, and the corresponding Bend unit price is 0.000012ETH;

 o Additional requirements:
     i.Lead investments by well-known institutions;
     ii.The community can further discuss the method of unlocking Bend toke: 1. After receiving the investment fund, the institution will immediately obtain Bend tokens without a lock-up; 2. Initial six-month lock-up, then a linear unlocking mechanism, with full unlocking in 2.5 years;
     iii.Lead investors are required to assist Bend to be listed on well-known trading platforms for free;
     iv. The minimum investment amount per share is 100 ETH;
     v. Each institution must provide KYC documents, and non-confidential contents of these document will be disclosed publicly in the community;
     vi.Each investors needs to provide the same amount of ETH as the investment amount and inject it into the ETH liquidity pool. This portion of the ETH will also benefit from normal yield farming income, but it will be locked-up for 12 months under the protocol, and can be withdrawn after this period expires;
  1. Management of non-performing asset investment funds:
    o A management team of 5 members is chosen by the community, and the election is held every year by the community. The election method is as follows: the group leader proposes a team of 5 members, and the community members vote to choose one of the teams;
    o The management team will receive 30% of the net gains of the fund as a reward;

9.Ecosystem Development Fund:
To be established with half of the amount of the second round financing;
o The purpose is to invest in and incubate ecosystem projects based on BendDAO;
o It will also managed by a management team elected by the community
/END/

#中文原版###############

关于建立 BendDAO 不良资产投资基金的提案

作者:Vis.eth, guoxinchen.eth, stephytao.eth;
发表日期:2022-08-25

提案背景:

在当下NFT市场交易持续萎靡、NFT价值回撤较大且流动性缺失等外因以及BendDAO协议本身设计不周的内因双重作用下,导致近期BendDAO协议出现短时间内大量ETH流动性撤出、借款利率飙升、坏账风险涌现等不良情况的发生。

为了让BendDAO成为NFT借贷龙头,为借贷双方提供更加稳定、安全、高效的服务,避免囚徒困境增加市场和社区对BendDAO协议的信心,我们发起了以下提案:

提案目标:

  1. 挤兑的核心原因来自于对未来预期的信心不足,ETH流动性提供者迅速形成囚徒困境;
  2. 通过规则设计,迅速将绝大部分债务从ETH流动池中转移出去,打破囚徒困境;
  3. 使协议有不断增加自有资产的能力,并且应该随着TVL上升和时间的推移而不断增加;
  4. 自有资产将为债务调控、债务处置、债务缺口修复、生态孵化提供帮助;

提案内容:

  1. 在国库下建立一个子集国库,暂定名为“不良资产投资基金”(简称基金);

  2. 基金的资金来源:

    1. 每笔协议收入的20%(称为风险准备金)自动注入该基金;
    2. 在协议原定分给国库的21%代币份额中,划拨占总量10%的BendToken(10亿枚Bend)进行再融资,融资获得的款项(或代币)50%注入到该基金(融资的介绍在文后有说明);
  3. 自动以八折收购不良资产:该基金的目的是在清算失效时(健康系数低于0.8,并且无人第一次出价竞标),该基金自动以债务金额*0.8的价格收购清算失效的NFT,在市场价格恢复后,由基金管理小组决策出售时机和出售价格;

  4. ETH债权人暂时性承担20%债务风险:当基金收购了不良资产时,ETH流动池仍然有20%的债务缺口,这部分风险敞口将由ETH债权方承担,即:在极端情况下,ETH债权人仍然有可能有小部分ETH资金(债务总规模的20%)暂时无法随时提现,当债务缺口被修复后,债权人的ETH提现额度将会恢复;

  5. 自动修复ETH流动池债务缺口:当ETH流动池出现债务缺口时,风险准备金自动提高到协议总收入的40%,其中的二分之一开始注入到ETH流动池,直到债务缺口被修复,风险准备金自动降为协议总收入的20%;

  6. 投资基金获得收益后修复债务缺口:当不良资产投资基金出售NFT并获得收益后,若ETH流动池中的债务仍然存在缺口,则基金净收入将注入到ETH流动池,帮助偿还债务,注入金额为:净收益的100%但不超过债务缺口金额;

  7. 第二次融资:

    1. 面向专业机构;(由团队出面挑选有意向且专业有影响力的VC机构或KOL并在DAO内发布提案和融资细节,也欢迎任何有意向的机构和个人发出他们的提案在BendDAO论坛内。两种方式都将由DAO共同协商决定)
    2. 从国库份额中划拨占总量10%的BendToken(10亿枚Bend)进行融资;
    3. 融资的50%注入到该不良资产投资基金,另外50%注入到生态建设基金(同样隶属于BendDAO国库之下);
    4. 投后估值约为2亿美元(可由社区讨论后调整),融资币种为ETH,兑换价格为100ETH=8333333.33Bend,融资ETH数量为12000枚,对应Bend单价为0.000012ETH;
    5. 附加要求:
      1. 知名投资机领投;
      2. 关于Bend代币解锁方式由社区讨论:1.投资金额到账后,机构将立即获得Bend代币,不锁定;2.先锁定六个月,其后线性解锁,2.5年解锁完毕;
      3. 领投机构需帮助Bend无偿上架知名交易平台;
      4. 每份最小投资额度为100ETH;
      5. 每家机构都必须提供KYC文件,该文件非隐私内容将在社区公示;
      6. 每家机构都需同时提供与投资额相同数量的ETH注入ETH流动池,这部分ETH也将享有正常的挖矿收益,但是将由协议控制自动锁定12个月,到期后可以自行提现;
  8. 不良资产投资基金的管理:

    1. 由社区选举出5人的管理小组,每年换届交由社区投票选举,选举方式为:小组负责人提出自己的五人小组成员,社区成员投票决定选择其中一个小组;
    2. 管理小组将获得基金净收益的30%做为奖励;
  9. 生态发展基金:

    1. 由第二次融资的一半资金建立;
    2. 目的是投资并孵化基于BendDAO的生态项目;
    3. 同样交由社区选举出的管理小组进行管理;
      //
4 Likes

非常好的提议,benddao现在需要一个 出现黑天鹅事件 的最终解决方案,以进一步降低风险。
关于提案,我有几个问题请教一下:
1,关于估值问题。从IFO时发展至今,个人认为BENDDAO至少是IFO时估值的5倍(以ETH计价)以上。如果以美元计价,融资价格应该是$0.045。(提案的估值为IFO时的4倍)
2,关于机构的解锁日期以及上架知名交易平台,(这两点的利益是相关联的,机构需要等待代币解锁到一定程度,有可能才会上架知名交易所。)。(是否需要设置硬性的上架时间)
3,关于不良资产投资基金的管理,这其中有净收益的30%做为奖励。那么,是否需要设置惩罚的机制。即利益与协议绑定,因为提案里的设置,似乎对这个小组没有任何约束,盈利可以抽成,亏损由协议收入补偿。(如:需要竞选不良资产投资基金管理的小组,抵押一定数量的BEND到国库,如果亏损,由抵押的BEND来补偿)

以上纯属个人主观的意见,如有冒犯,还请见谅。

2 Likes

请收下我的双手双脚,感觉是特别棒的提议,国库是需要充分利用的资源
我也有两点问题想请教一下:
1、不良资产投资基金,更像是一个兜底保障,在不需要执行兜底时这部分资金如何使用
2、出现大面积资产退潮时,兜底资金的体量很可能并不足以负担所有80%的债务
3、如果遇到某个单独项目的黑天鹅事件,基金可能成为某个项目的最后兜底方。

veBend的功能除了可以治理投票也可以享受協議的收入
協議中或許可以新增一項“不良資產投資基金”的優先投資權
不良資產投資基金,不用基金出資八折讓BendDAO虧本,並讓一個基金獨自面臨20%的風險,並且成立基金GP們要有績效而LP也會有面臨結算投資回報的一天,要等到清算LP才有收益的回報。LP們還要拿一筆ETH來擺著等待。

例如:
如果一個BAYC是65個ETH的債務(貸款包含利息),當該NFT遭到清算的時候
先舉辦第一輪BendDAO內部拍賣
(銀行拍賣)銀拍屋讓支持BendDAO有veBend的人可以優先標得優質不良資產,但是不得低於債務(貸款包含利息)

(當發生清算才需要vebend持有人針對該NFT籌資提供ETH流動性,不用為了可能發生的清算危機提前準備ETH)

這時候想要低價標得優質不良資產
可以看誰的Vebend多誰可以優先標示願意出資收購此不良資產的ETH投資份額
不用一個人全資收購,而是可以讓有veBend 持有人可以分食這優質不良債的餅
這65ETH債務(貸款包含利息)有veBend的人可以優先投資
按veBend持有數量的人比例出資(或者是定一個出資的順序),例如有個6m的veBend 他可以先出他願意的出資比例
他願意拿15ETH來投資這個,剩下來的50ETH再給4m的再給3m的以此類推,最後可以用眾人的力量
拿下該筆"優質不良資產",之後這個NFT在二級市場出售應該讓這筆不良債權的投資人可以按投資份額均分這個NFT在市場上銷售的收益

如果誰的$veBend多 誰可以先設定投資份額,讓有veBend的人可以一起用ETH圍標,沒有veBend的人只能流口水 看人家標優質的不良債權

如果第一階段拍賣流標,接下來才啟動第二階段拍賣
才到公開市場上去法拍(法院拍賣)公開讓大家來標

如果第一階段拍賣內部veBend持有人圍標成功,那就雨露均霑有投資veBEND的人 除了協議收益,還可以分食優質不良債權的二級銷售收益

另外我覺得LV也是有分便宜貨跟高檔貨
藍籌NFT也是,高價金猴流動性差,但是不應該跟地板猴一個借貸價錢,這樣沒人會拿高檔貨來當鋪當,所有的高檔貨都被當便宜貨,這點或許可以優化多增加一些維度
例如:毛色、西裝、雷射眼…等等有高價共識的屬性可以貸到不是地板的價錢
讓不同價值的NFT可以流入BendDAO中,如果有一天高檔猴面臨清算,veBend的持有人有機會可以持分高檔猴的銷售利益

  1. Community could discuss the new valuation;
  2. It’s a good advise to set a listing time;
  3. Good idea! but I suggest we could improve it later if this proposal is passed.

This’s a good suggestion on improvement of liquidation method, the purpose of this proposal is to try to find a way to reduce or cancel the debt risk immediately, cause the liquidation may bring other results beyond the contract control.

1 Like
  1. Keep it ? or put into curve?
  2. That’s a good question, that means the fund undertaking capacity is broken down;
  3. Yes

I personally agree that benddao needs such a fund.
But the details are such that we may need to consider it carefully.

Let’s see what others have some better suggestions, and next, we can get into the details.

1 Like

In fact, the first goal of the proposal requires that some of the tokens be financed from the treasury.

Only when the goal of financing is achieved can we proceed with other things, and I suggest that we can start with a detailed discussion on the issue of financing.

事实上,该提案的第一个目标是需要从国库中拿出部分代币进行融资。
只有实现了融资的目标,我们才能进行其他的事情,我建议我们可以先对融资的问题进行详细讨论。

We can discuss the details of the financing in detail.
We call on community members who have experience in this area and have ideas to speak up.

我们可以就融资的细节,进行详细的讨论。
呼吁对这方面有经验的,有想法的社区成员可以积极发言。

非常赞同你,用国库资产进行不良资产投资本质上将平台风险进一步转移到Bend代币持有人身上,所以理应赋予VeBend更多的权利。

1 Like

建立SubDAO 通过VC fund的方式take 不良资产的risk,根本目标还是希望能够跟ETH存款用户更多的收益预期,避免下一次市场下跌引发的流动性挤兑问题。所以我建议在第6条:“ 6. 投资基金获得收益后修复债务缺口:当不良资产投资基金出售NFT并获得收益后,若ETH流动池中的债务仍然存在缺口,则基金净收入将注入到ETH流动池,帮助偿还债务,注入金额为:净收益的100%但不超过债务缺口金额;”,能够调整为:“注入金额为:净收益的100%,如果净收益大于债务缺口,则剩余盈利部分分15%给到ETH存款用户作为额外奖励。”

事实上,这同时也是引入最佳治理参与方(相关利益方)最好的机会。驱动持币人参与治理最佳的选择就是相关利益方
目前BendDAO的最佳利益相关方就是平台上的NFT资产背后的项目方,他们如果能以此机会持有BendDAOD的代币,对BendDAO而言将会大大提高治理参与度,因为BendDAO接下来做的每一次治理都会与他们直接相关,他们会有非常大的动力参与治理中。
因此我希望将BendDAO的利益相关方列为融资的优先选项。

3 Likes

I agree with you, if the we can involve them, that would be better.

Aye Aye 哈哈哈哈哈哈哈哈哈哈哈哈

The ETH depositors can ask to adjust the base ETH rate and the interests curve, but liquidators make risk and try to help BendDAO make the liquidation finished.

I strongly suggest don’t mix them together, it’s two different roles in lending system, mixed them won’t be a good idea.

I think this proposal is trying to make a fund to making more liquidators, not for making more money for ETH depositor, if any ETH depositors want to join the liquidation, withdraw your ETH before no ETH in the pool.

BendDAO will organize a twitter space to discuss this proposal furthermore on 4th Sep, Pls stay tuned. After the discussion, next step is we need to aim to summary the key terms from this proposal for community voting.

1 Like

It involves more risk for bendDAO protocol if paying money to bad NFTs. Not a good idea. When the protocol goes bankrupt, everyone becomes a loser.

2 Likes